diff --git a/libc/Android.mk b/libc/Android.mk
index fd3da96..0bdf1a5 100644
--- a/libc/Android.mk
+++ b/libc/Android.mk
@@ -37,7 +37,6 @@
 # Define the common source files for all the libc instances
 # =========================================================
 libc_common_src_files := \
-    bionic/arc4random.c \
     bionic/bindresvport.c \
     bionic/daemon.c \
     bionic/err.c \
@@ -124,6 +123,7 @@
     bionic/futimens.cpp \
     bionic/getauxval.cpp \
     bionic/getcwd.cpp \
+    bionic/getentropy_linux.c \
     bionic/getpgrp.cpp \
     bionic/getpid.cpp \
     bionic/gettid.cpp \
@@ -335,6 +335,8 @@
     upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/gdtoa/strtorQ.c \
 
 libc_upstream_openbsd_src_files := \
+    upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c \
+    upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c \
     upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/gen/alarm.c \
     upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/gen/ctype_.c \
     upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/gen/exec.c \
diff --git a/libc/bionic/arc4random.c b/libc/bionic/arc4random.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 9bdf341..0000000
--- a/libc/bionic/arc4random.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,288 +0,0 @@
-/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.33 2014/06/13 18:58:58 deraadt Exp $	*/
-
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
- * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD.
- */
-
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <limits.h>
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/mman.h>
-
-#if defined(__ANDROID__)
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <linux/random.h>
-#include "private/libc_logging.h"
-#include "private/thread_private.h"
-
-#define explicit_bzero(p, s) memset(p, 0, s)
-
-#undef MAP_ANON
-#define MAP_ANON (MAP_PRIVATE | MAP_ANONYMOUS)
-
-/*
- * XXX Should be replaced with a proper entropy measure.
- */
-static int
-gotdata(u_char *buf, size_t len)
-{
-	char	any_set = 0;
-	size_t	i;
-
-	for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
-		any_set |= buf[i];
-	if (any_set == 0)
-		return -1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-static int
-getentropy/*_urandom*/(u_char *buf, size_t len)
-{
-	int save_errno = errno;
-
-	int fd = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOFOLLOW, 0));
-	if (fd == -1) {
-		__libc_fatal("getentropy_urandom failed to open \"/dev/urandom\": %s",
-				strerror(errno));
-	}
-
-	/* Lightly verify that the device node looks sane */
-	struct stat st;
-	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1 || !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) {
-		__libc_fatal("getentropy_urandom failed to fstat \"/dev/urandom\": %s",
-				strerror(errno));
-	}
-	int cnt;
-	if (ioctl(fd, RNDGETENTCNT, &cnt) == -1) {
-		__libc_fatal("getentropy_urandom failed to ioctl \"/dev/urandom\": %s",
-				strerror(errno));
-	}
-	for (size_t i = 0; i < len; ) {
-		size_t wanted = len - i;
-		ssize_t ret = TEMP_FAILURE_RETRY(read(fd, buf + i, wanted));
-
-		if (ret == -1) {
-			__libc_fatal("getentropy_urandom failed to read \"/dev/urandom\": %s",
-					strerror(errno));
-		}
-		i += ret;
-	}
-	close(fd);
-	if (gotdata(buf, len) == -1) {
-		__libc_fatal("getentropy_urandom failed to get enough entropy: %s",
-				strerror(errno));
-	}
-
-	errno = save_errno;
-	return 0;
-}
-#endif /* __ANDROID__ */
-
-#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
-#pragma GCC diagnostic push
-#pragma GCC diagnostic ignored "-Wunused-parameter"
-#include "../upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/chacha_private.h"
-#pragma GCC diagnostic pop
-
-#ifdef __GNUC__
-#define inline __inline
-#else				/* !__GNUC__ */
-#define inline
-#endif				/* !__GNUC__ */
-
-#define KEYSZ	32
-#define IVSZ	8
-#define BLOCKSZ	64
-#define RSBUFSZ	(16*BLOCKSZ)
-static int rs_initialized;
-static pid_t rs_stir_pid;
-static chacha_ctx *rs;		/* chacha context for random keystream */
-static u_char *rs_buf;		/* keystream blocks */
-static size_t rs_have;		/* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */
-static size_t rs_count;		/* bytes till reseed */
-
-static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen);
-
-static inline void
-_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n)
-{
-	if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ)
-		return;
-
-	if (rs == NULL && (rs = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*rs), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
-	    MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
-		abort();
-	if (rs_buf == NULL && (rs_buf = mmap(NULL, RSBUFSZ, PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
-	    MAP_ANON, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
-		abort();
-
-	chacha_keysetup(rs, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0);
-	chacha_ivsetup(rs, buf + KEYSZ);
-}
-
-static void
-_rs_stir(void)
-{
-	u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
-
-	/* XXX */
-	(void) getentropy(rnd, sizeof rnd);
-
-	if (!rs_initialized) {
-		rs_initialized = 1;
-		_rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-	} else
-		_rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
-
-	/* invalidate rs_buf */
-	rs_have = 0;
-	memset(rs_buf, 0, RSBUFSZ);
-
-	rs_count = 1600000;
-}
-
-static inline void
-_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len)
-{
-	pid_t pid = getpid();
-
-	if (rs_count <= len || !rs_initialized || rs_stir_pid != pid) {
-		rs_stir_pid = pid;
-		_rs_stir();
-	} else
-		rs_count -= len;
-}
-
-static inline void
-_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen)
-{
-#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
-	memset(rs_buf, 0,RSBUFSZ);
-#endif
-	/* fill rs_buf with the keystream */
-	chacha_encrypt_bytes(rs, rs_buf, rs_buf, RSBUFSZ);
-	/* mix in optional user provided data */
-	if (dat) {
-		size_t i, m;
-
-		m = MIN(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
-		for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
-			rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i];
-	}
-	/* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */
-	_rs_init(rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
-	memset(rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
-	rs_have = RSBUFSZ - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
-}
-
-static inline void
-_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
-{
-	u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf;
-	size_t m;
-
-	_rs_stir_if_needed(n);
-	while (n > 0) {
-		if (rs_have > 0) {
-			m = MIN(n, rs_have);
-			memcpy(buf, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, m);
-			memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, m);
-			buf += m;
-			n -= m;
-			rs_have -= m;
-		}
-		if (rs_have == 0)
-			_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
-	}
-}
-
-static inline void
-_rs_random_u32(u_int32_t *val)
-{
-	_rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val));
-	if (rs_have < sizeof(*val))
-		_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
-	memcpy(val, rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, sizeof(*val));
-	memset(rs_buf + RSBUFSZ - rs_have, 0, sizeof(*val));
-	rs_have -= sizeof(*val);
-}
-
-u_int32_t
-arc4random(void)
-{
-	u_int32_t val;
-
-	_ARC4_LOCK();
-	_rs_random_u32(&val);
-	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
-	return val;
-}
-
-void
-arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
-{
-	_ARC4_LOCK();
-	_rs_random_buf(buf, n);
-	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
-}
-
-/*
- * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
- * avoiding "modulo bias".
- *
- * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
- * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound).  This
- * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
- * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
- * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
- */
-u_int32_t
-arc4random_uniform(u_int32_t upper_bound)
-{
-	u_int32_t r, min;
-
-	if (upper_bound < 2)
-		return 0;
-
-	/* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
-	min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
-
-	/*
-	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
-	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
-	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
-	 * to re-roll.
-	 */
-	for (;;) {
-		r = arc4random();
-		if (r >= min)
-			break;
-	}
-
-	return r % upper_bound;
-}
diff --git a/libc/bionic/getentropy_linux.c b/libc/bionic/getentropy_linux.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..409bd7d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libc/bionic/getentropy_linux.c
@@ -0,0 +1,565 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: getentropy_linux.c,v 1.28 2014/07/20 03:24:10 deraadt Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Theo de Raadt <deraadt@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2014 Bob Beck <beck@obtuse.com>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ *
+ * Emulation of getentropy(2) as documented at:
+ * http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi/OpenBSD-current/man2/getentropy.2
+ */
+
+#define	_POSIX_C_SOURCE	199309L
+#define	_GNU_SOURCE	1
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/ioctl.h>
+#include <sys/resource.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SYS_SYSCTL_H
+#include <sys/sysctl.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/statvfs.h>
+#include <sys/socket.h>
+#include <sys/mount.h>
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <link.h>
+#include <termios.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <time.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#endif
+
+#include <linux/random.h>
+#include <linux/sysctl.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_GETAUXVAL
+#include <sys/auxv.h>
+#endif
+#include <sys/vfs.h>
+
+#define REPEAT 5
+#define min(a, b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
+
+#define HX(a, b) \
+	do { \
+		if ((a)) \
+			HD(errno); \
+		else \
+			HD(b); \
+	} while (0)
+
+#define HR(x, l) (SHA512_Update(&ctx, (char *)(x), (l)))
+#define HD(x)	 (SHA512_Update(&ctx, (char *)&(x), sizeof (x)))
+#define HF(x)    (SHA512_Update(&ctx, (char *)&(x), sizeof (void*)))
+
+int	getentropy(void *buf, size_t len);
+
+static int gotdata(char *buf, size_t len);
+#ifdef SYS__getrandom
+static int getentropy_getrandom(void *buf, size_t len);
+#endif
+static int getentropy_urandom(void *buf, size_t len);
+#ifdef SYS__sysctl
+static int getentropy_sysctl(void *buf, size_t len);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+static int getentropy_fallback(void *buf, size_t len);
+static int getentropy_phdr(struct dl_phdr_info *info, size_t size, void *data);
+#endif
+
+int
+getentropy(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	int ret = -1;
+
+	if (len > 256) {
+		errno = EIO;
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+#ifdef SYS__getrandom
+	/*
+	 * Try descriptor-less getrandom()
+	 */
+	ret = getentropy_getrandom(buf, len);
+	if (ret != -1)
+		return (ret);
+#endif
+
+	/*
+	 * Try to get entropy with /dev/urandom
+	 *
+	 * This can fail if the process is inside a chroot or if file
+	 * descriptors are exhausted.
+	 */
+	ret = getentropy_urandom(buf, len);
+	if (ret != -1)
+		return (ret);
+
+#ifdef SYS__sysctl
+	/*
+	 * Try to use sysctl CTL_KERN, KERN_RANDOM, RANDOM_UUID.
+	 * sysctl is a failsafe API, so it guarantees a result.  This
+	 * should work inside a chroot, or when file descriptors are
+	 * exhuasted.
+	 *
+	 * However this can fail if the Linux kernel removes support
+	 * for sysctl.  Starting in 2007, there have been efforts to
+	 * deprecate the sysctl API/ABI, and push callers towards use
+	 * of the chroot-unavailable fd-using /proc mechanism --
+	 * essentially the same problems as /dev/urandom.
+	 *
+	 * Numerous setbacks have been encountered in their deprecation
+	 * schedule, so as of June 2014 the kernel ABI still exists on
+	 * most Linux architectures. The sysctl() stub in libc is missing
+	 * on some systems.  There are also reports that some kernels
+	 * spew messages to the console.
+	 */
+	ret = getentropy_sysctl(buf, len);
+	if (ret != -1)
+		return (ret);
+#endif /* SYS__sysctl */
+
+	/*
+	 * Entropy collection via /dev/urandom and sysctl have failed.
+	 *
+	 * No other API exists for collecting entropy.  See the large
+	 * comment block above.
+	 *
+	 * We have very few options:
+	 *     - Even syslog_r is unsafe to call at this low level, so
+	 *	 there is no way to alert the user or program.
+	 *     - Cannot call abort() because some systems have unsafe
+	 *	 corefiles.
+	 *     - Could raise(SIGKILL) resulting in silent program termination.
+	 *     - Return EIO, to hint that arc4random's stir function
+	 *       should raise(SIGKILL)
+	 *     - Do the best under the circumstances....
+	 *
+	 * This code path exists to bring light to the issue that Linux
+	 * does not provide a failsafe API for entropy collection.
+	 *
+	 * We hope this demonstrates that Linux should either retain their
+	 * sysctl ABI, or consider providing a new failsafe API which
+	 * works in a chroot or when file descriptors are exhausted.
+	 */
+#undef FAIL_INSTEAD_OF_TRYING_FALLBACK
+#ifdef FAIL_INSTEAD_OF_TRYING_FALLBACK
+	raise(SIGKILL);
+#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+	ret = getentropy_fallback(buf, len);
+	if (ret != -1)
+		return (ret);
+#endif
+
+	errno = EIO;
+	return (ret);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Basic sanity checking; wish we could do better.
+ */
+static int
+gotdata(char *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	char	any_set = 0;
+	size_t	i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; ++i)
+		any_set |= buf[i];
+	if (any_set == 0)
+		return -1;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+#ifdef SYS__getrandom
+static int
+getentropy_getrandom(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+#if 0
+
+/* Hand-definitions until the API becomes commonplace */
+#ifndef SYS__getrandom
+#ifdef __LP64__
+#define SYS__getrandom 317
+#else
+#define SYS__getrandom 354
+#endif
+#endif
+	struct __getrandom_args args = {
+		.buf = buf;
+		.len = len;
+		.flags = 0;
+	};
+
+	if (len > 256)
+		return (-1);
+	ret = syscall(SYS__getrandom, &args);
+	if (ret == len)
+		return (0);
+#endif
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int
+getentropy_urandom(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	struct stat st;
+	size_t i;
+	int fd, cnt, flags;
+	int save_errno = errno;
+
+start:
+
+	flags = O_RDONLY;
+#ifdef O_NOFOLLOW
+	flags |= O_NOFOLLOW;
+#endif
+#ifdef O_CLOEXEC
+	flags |= O_CLOEXEC;
+#endif
+	fd = open("/dev/urandom", flags, 0);
+	if (fd == -1) {
+		if (errno == EINTR)
+			goto start;
+		goto nodevrandom;
+	}
+#ifndef O_CLOEXEC
+	fcntl(fd, F_SETFD, fcntl(fd, F_GETFD) | FD_CLOEXEC);
+#endif
+
+	/* Lightly verify that the device node looks sane */
+	if (fstat(fd, &st) == -1 || !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) {
+		close(fd);
+		goto nodevrandom;
+	}
+	if (ioctl(fd, RNDGETENTCNT, &cnt) == -1) {
+		close(fd);
+		goto nodevrandom;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < len; ) {
+		size_t wanted = len - i;
+		ssize_t ret = read(fd, (char *)buf + i, wanted);
+
+		if (ret == -1) {
+			if (errno == EAGAIN || errno == EINTR)
+				continue;
+			close(fd);
+			goto nodevrandom;
+		}
+		i += ret;
+	}
+	close(fd);
+	if (gotdata(buf, len) == 0) {
+		errno = save_errno;
+		return 0;		/* satisfied */
+	}
+nodevrandom:
+	errno = EIO;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef SYS__sysctl
+static int
+getentropy_sysctl(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	static int mib[] = { CTL_KERN, KERN_RANDOM, RANDOM_UUID };
+	size_t i;
+	int save_errno = errno;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < len; ) {
+		size_t chunk = min(len - i, 16);
+
+		/* SYS__sysctl because some systems already removed sysctl() */
+		struct __sysctl_args args = {
+			.name = mib,
+			.nlen = 3,
+			.oldval = (char*) buf + i,
+			.oldlenp = &chunk,
+		};
+		if (syscall(SYS__sysctl, &args) != 0)
+			goto sysctlfailed;
+		i += chunk;
+	}
+	if (gotdata(buf, len) == 0) {
+		errno = save_errno;
+		return (0);			/* satisfied */
+	}
+sysctlfailed:
+	errno = EIO;
+	return -1;
+}
+#endif /* SYS__sysctl */
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+
+static int cl[] = {
+	CLOCK_REALTIME,
+#ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC
+	CLOCK_MONOTONIC,
+#endif
+#ifdef CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW
+	CLOCK_MONOTONIC_RAW,
+#endif
+#ifdef CLOCK_TAI
+	CLOCK_TAI,
+#endif
+#ifdef CLOCK_VIRTUAL
+	CLOCK_VIRTUAL,
+#endif
+#ifdef CLOCK_UPTIME
+	CLOCK_UPTIME,
+#endif
+#ifdef CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID
+	CLOCK_PROCESS_CPUTIME_ID,
+#endif
+#ifdef CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID
+	CLOCK_THREAD_CPUTIME_ID,
+#endif
+};
+
+static int
+getentropy_phdr(struct dl_phdr_info *info, size_t size, void *data)
+{
+	SHA512_CTX *ctx = data;
+
+	SHA512_Update(ctx, &info->dlpi_addr, sizeof (info->dlpi_addr));
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static int
+getentropy_fallback(void *buf, size_t len)
+{
+	uint8_t results[SHA512_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+	int save_errno = errno, e, pgs = getpagesize(), faster = 0, repeat;
+	static int cnt;
+	struct timespec ts;
+	struct timeval tv;
+	struct rusage ru;
+	sigset_t sigset;
+	struct stat st;
+	SHA512_CTX ctx;
+	static pid_t lastpid;
+	pid_t pid;
+	size_t i, ii, m;
+	char *p;
+
+	pid = getpid();
+	if (lastpid == pid) {
+		faster = 1;
+		repeat = 2;
+	} else {
+		faster = 0;
+		lastpid = pid;
+		repeat = REPEAT;
+	}
+	for (i = 0; i < len; ) {
+		int j;
+		SHA512_Init(&ctx);
+		for (j = 0; j < repeat; j++) {
+			HX((e = gettimeofday(&tv, NULL)) == -1, tv);
+			if (e != -1) {
+				cnt += (int)tv.tv_sec;
+				cnt += (int)tv.tv_usec;
+			}
+
+			dl_iterate_phdr(getentropy_phdr, &ctx);
+
+			for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(cl)/sizeof(cl[0]); ii++)
+				HX(clock_gettime(cl[ii], &ts) == -1, ts);
+
+			HX((pid = getpid()) == -1, pid);
+			HX((pid = getsid(pid)) == -1, pid);
+			HX((pid = getppid()) == -1, pid);
+			HX((pid = getpgid(0)) == -1, pid);
+			HX((e = getpriority(0, 0)) == -1, e);
+
+			if (!faster) {
+				ts.tv_sec = 0;
+				ts.tv_nsec = 1;
+				(void) nanosleep(&ts, NULL);
+			}
+
+			HX(sigpending(&sigset) == -1, sigset);
+			HX(sigprocmask(SIG_BLOCK, NULL, &sigset) == -1,
+			    sigset);
+
+			HF(getentropy);	/* an addr in this library */
+			HF(printf);		/* an addr in libc */
+			p = (char *)&p;
+			HD(p);		/* an addr on stack */
+			p = (char *)&errno;
+			HD(p);		/* the addr of errno */
+
+			if (i == 0) {
+				struct sockaddr_storage ss;
+				struct statvfs stvfs;
+				struct termios tios;
+				struct statfs stfs;
+				socklen_t ssl;
+				off_t off;
+
+				/*
+				 * Prime-sized mappings encourage fragmentation;
+				 * thus exposing some address entropy.
+				 */
+				struct mm {
+					size_t	npg;
+					void	*p;
+				} mm[] =	 {
+					{ 17, MAP_FAILED }, { 3, MAP_FAILED },
+					{ 11, MAP_FAILED }, { 2, MAP_FAILED },
+					{ 5, MAP_FAILED }, { 3, MAP_FAILED },
+					{ 7, MAP_FAILED }, { 1, MAP_FAILED },
+					{ 57, MAP_FAILED }, { 3, MAP_FAILED },
+					{ 131, MAP_FAILED }, { 1, MAP_FAILED },
+				};
+
+				for (m = 0; m < sizeof mm/sizeof(mm[0]); m++) {
+					HX(mm[m].p = mmap(NULL,
+					    mm[m].npg * pgs,
+					    PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+					    MAP_PRIVATE|MAP_ANON, -1,
+					    (off_t)0), mm[m].p);
+					if (mm[m].p != MAP_FAILED) {
+						size_t mo;
+
+						/* Touch some memory... */
+						p = mm[m].p;
+						mo = cnt %
+						    (mm[m].npg * pgs - 1);
+						p[mo] = 1;
+						cnt += (int)((long)(mm[m].p)
+						    / pgs);
+					}
+
+					/* Check cnts and times... */
+					for (ii = 0; ii < sizeof(cl)/sizeof(cl[0]);
+					    ii++) {
+						HX((e = clock_gettime(cl[ii],
+						    &ts)) == -1, ts);
+						if (e != -1)
+							cnt += (int)ts.tv_nsec;
+					}
+
+					HX((e = getrusage(RUSAGE_SELF,
+					    &ru)) == -1, ru);
+					if (e != -1) {
+						cnt += (int)ru.ru_utime.tv_sec;
+						cnt += (int)ru.ru_utime.tv_usec;
+					}
+				}
+
+				for (m = 0; m < sizeof mm/sizeof(mm[0]); m++) {
+					if (mm[m].p != MAP_FAILED)
+						munmap(mm[m].p, mm[m].npg * pgs);
+					mm[m].p = MAP_FAILED;
+				}
+
+				HX(stat(".", &st) == -1, st);
+				HX(statvfs(".", &stvfs) == -1, stvfs);
+				HX(statfs(".", &stfs) == -1, stfs);
+
+				HX(stat("/", &st) == -1, st);
+				HX(statvfs("/", &stvfs) == -1, stvfs);
+				HX(statfs("/", &stfs) == -1, stfs);
+
+				HX((e = fstat(0, &st)) == -1, st);
+				if (e == -1) {
+					if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) ||
+					    S_ISFIFO(st.st_mode) ||
+					    S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) {
+						HX(fstatvfs(0, &stvfs) == -1,
+						    stvfs);
+						HX(fstatfs(0, &stfs) == -1,
+						    stfs);
+						HX((off = lseek(0, (off_t)0,
+						    SEEK_CUR)) < 0, off);
+					}
+					if (S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) {
+						HX(tcgetattr(0, &tios) == -1,
+						    tios);
+					} else if (S_ISSOCK(st.st_mode)) {
+						memset(&ss, 0, sizeof ss);
+						ssl = sizeof(ss);
+						HX(getpeername(0,
+						    (void *)&ss, &ssl) == -1,
+						    ss);
+					}
+				}
+
+				HX((e = getrusage(RUSAGE_CHILDREN,
+				    &ru)) == -1, ru);
+				if (e != -1) {
+					cnt += (int)ru.ru_utime.tv_sec;
+					cnt += (int)ru.ru_utime.tv_usec;
+				}
+			} else {
+				/* Subsequent hashes absorb previous result */
+				HD(results);
+			}
+
+			HX((e = gettimeofday(&tv, NULL)) == -1, tv);
+			if (e != -1) {
+				cnt += (int)tv.tv_sec;
+				cnt += (int)tv.tv_usec;
+			}
+
+			HD(cnt);
+		}
+#ifdef HAVE_GETAUXVAL
+#ifdef AT_RANDOM
+		/* Not as random as you think but we take what we are given */
+		p = (char *) getauxval(AT_RANDOM);
+		if (p)
+			HR(p, 16);
+#endif
+#ifdef AT_SYSINFO_EHDR
+		p = (char *) getauxval(AT_SYSINFO_EHDR);
+		if (p)
+			HR(p, pgs);
+#endif
+#ifdef AT_BASE
+		p = (char *) getauxval(AT_BASE);
+		if (p)
+			HD(p);
+#endif
+#endif
+
+		SHA512_Final(results, &ctx);
+		memcpy((char *)buf + i, results, min(sizeof(results), len - i));
+		i += min(sizeof(results), len - i);
+	}
+	memset(results, 0, sizeof results);
+	if (gotdata(buf, len) == 0) {
+		errno = save_errno;
+		return 0;		/* satisfied */
+	}
+	errno = EIO;
+	return -1;
+}
+
+#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL */
diff --git a/libc/private/thread_private.h b/libc/private/thread_private.h
index b8b1a81..2e3ac3d 100644
--- a/libc/private/thread_private.h
+++ b/libc/private/thread_private.h
@@ -46,8 +46,9 @@
 __LIBC_HIDDEN__ void    _thread_arc4_lock(void);
 __LIBC_HIDDEN__ void    _thread_arc4_unlock(void);
 
-#define  _ARC4_LOCK() _thread_arc4_lock()
-#define  _ARC4_UNLOCK() _thread_arc4_unlock()
+#define _ARC4_LOCK() _thread_arc4_lock()
+#define _ARC4_UNLOCK() _thread_arc4_unlock()
+#define _ARC4_ATFORK(f) pthread_atfork(NULL, NULL, (f))
 
 __END_DECLS
 
diff --git a/libc/upstream-openbsd/android/include/arc4random.h b/libc/upstream-openbsd/android/include/arc4random.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c07257d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libc/upstream-openbsd/android/include/arc4random.h
@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random_linux.h,v 1.7 2014/07/20 20:51:13 bcook Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Stub functions for portability.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/mman.h>
+
+#include <pthread.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+
+// Android gets these from "thread_private.h".
+#include "thread_private.h"
+//static pthread_mutex_t arc4random_mtx = PTHREAD_MUTEX_INITIALIZER;
+//#define _ARC4_LOCK()   pthread_mutex_lock(&arc4random_mtx)
+//#define _ARC4_UNLOCK() pthread_mutex_unlock(&arc4random_mtx)
+
+#ifdef __GLIBC__
+extern void *__dso_handle;
+extern int __register_atfork(void (*)(void), void(*)(void), void (*)(void), void *);
+#define _ARC4_ATFORK(f) __register_atfork(NULL, NULL, (f), __dso_handle)
+#else
+#define _ARC4_ATFORK(f) pthread_atfork(NULL, NULL, (f))
+#endif
+
+static inline void
+_getentropy_fail(void)
+{
+	raise(SIGKILL);
+}
+
+static volatile sig_atomic_t _rs_forked;
+
+static inline void
+_rs_forkhandler(void)
+{
+	_rs_forked = 1;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_forkdetect(void)
+{
+	static pid_t _rs_pid = 0;
+	pid_t pid = getpid();
+
+	if (_rs_pid == 0 || _rs_pid != pid || _rs_forked) {
+		_rs_pid = pid;
+		_rs_forked = 0;
+		if (rs)
+			memset(rs, 0, sizeof(*rs));
+	}
+}
+
+static inline int
+_rs_allocate(struct _rs **rsp, struct _rsx **rsxp)
+{
+	if ((*rsp = mmap(NULL, sizeof(**rsp), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+	    MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED)
+		return (-1);
+
+	if ((*rsxp = mmap(NULL, sizeof(**rsxp), PROT_READ|PROT_WRITE,
+	    MAP_ANON|MAP_PRIVATE, -1, 0)) == MAP_FAILED) {
+		munmap(*rsxp, sizeof(**rsxp));
+		return (-1);
+	}
+
+	_ARC4_ATFORK(_rs_forkhandler);
+	return (0);
+}
diff --git a/libc/upstream-openbsd/android/include/openbsd-compat.h b/libc/upstream-openbsd/android/include/openbsd-compat.h
index 5827a82..34ad2c5 100644
--- a/libc/upstream-openbsd/android/include/openbsd-compat.h
+++ b/libc/upstream-openbsd/android/include/openbsd-compat.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 #define _BIONIC_OPENBSD_COMPAT_H_included
 
 #include <sys/cdefs.h>
+#include <stddef.h> // For size_t.
 
 #define __USE_BSD
 
@@ -36,6 +37,11 @@
 /* OpenBSD has this, but we can't really implement it correctly on Linux. */
 #define issetugid() 0
 
+#define explicit_bzero(p, s) memset(p, 0, s)
+
+/* We have OpenBSD's getentropy_linux.c, but we don't mention getentropy in any header. */
+__LIBC_HIDDEN__ extern int getentropy(void*, size_t);
+
 /* LP32 NDK ctype.h contained references to these. */
 __LIBC64_HIDDEN__ extern const short* _tolower_tab_;
 __LIBC64_HIDDEN__ extern const short* _toupper_tab_;
diff --git a/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c b/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..64248b6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random.c
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random.c,v 1.50 2014/07/21 18:13:12 deraadt Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 1996, David Mazieres <dm@uun.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ * Copyright (c) 2013, Markus Friedl <markus@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * ChaCha based random number generator for OpenBSD.
+ */
+
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/param.h>
+#include <sys/time.h>
+
+#define KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+#include "chacha_private.h"
+
+#define min(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
+#ifdef __GNUC__
+#define inline __inline
+#else				/* !__GNUC__ */
+#define inline
+#endif				/* !__GNUC__ */
+
+#define KEYSZ	32
+#define IVSZ	8
+#define BLOCKSZ	64
+#define RSBUFSZ	(16*BLOCKSZ)
+
+/* Marked MAP_INHERIT_ZERO, so zero'd out in fork children. */
+static struct _rs {
+	size_t		rs_have;	/* valid bytes at end of rs_buf */
+	size_t		rs_count;	/* bytes till reseed */
+} *rs;
+
+/* Maybe be preserved in fork children, if _rs_allocate() decides. */
+static struct _rsx {
+	chacha_ctx	rs_chacha;	/* chacha context for random keystream */
+	u_char		rs_buf[RSBUFSZ];	/* keystream blocks */
+} *rsx;
+
+static inline int _rs_allocate(struct _rs **, struct _rsx **);
+static inline void _rs_forkdetect(void);
+#include "arc4random.h"
+
+static inline void _rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen);
+
+static inline void
+_rs_init(u_char *buf, size_t n)
+{
+	if (n < KEYSZ + IVSZ)
+		return;
+
+	if (rs == NULL) {
+		if (_rs_allocate(&rs, &rsx) == -1)
+			abort();
+	}
+
+	chacha_keysetup(&rsx->rs_chacha, buf, KEYSZ * 8, 0);
+	chacha_ivsetup(&rsx->rs_chacha, buf + KEYSZ);
+}
+
+static void
+_rs_stir(void)
+{
+	u_char rnd[KEYSZ + IVSZ];
+
+	if (getentropy(rnd, sizeof rnd) == -1)
+		_getentropy_fail();
+
+	if (!rs)
+		_rs_init(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	else
+		_rs_rekey(rnd, sizeof(rnd));
+	explicit_bzero(rnd, sizeof(rnd));	/* discard source seed */
+
+	/* invalidate rs_buf */
+	rs->rs_have = 0;
+	memset(rsx->rs_buf, 0, sizeof(rsx->rs_buf));
+
+	rs->rs_count = 1600000;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_stir_if_needed(size_t len)
+{
+	_rs_forkdetect();
+	if (!rs || rs->rs_count <= len)
+		_rs_stir();
+	if (rs->rs_count <= len)
+		rs->rs_count = 0;
+	else
+		rs->rs_count -= len;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_rekey(u_char *dat, size_t datlen)
+{
+#ifndef KEYSTREAM_ONLY
+	memset(rsx->rs_buf, 0, sizeof(rsx->rs_buf));
+#endif
+	/* fill rs_buf with the keystream */
+	chacha_encrypt_bytes(&rsx->rs_chacha, rsx->rs_buf,
+	    rsx->rs_buf, sizeof(rsx->rs_buf));
+	/* mix in optional user provided data */
+	if (dat) {
+		size_t i, m;
+
+		m = min(datlen, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+		for (i = 0; i < m; i++)
+			rsx->rs_buf[i] ^= dat[i];
+	}
+	/* immediately reinit for backtracking resistance */
+	_rs_init(rsx->rs_buf, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+	memset(rsx->rs_buf, 0, KEYSZ + IVSZ);
+	rs->rs_have = sizeof(rsx->rs_buf) - KEYSZ - IVSZ;
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_random_buf(void *_buf, size_t n)
+{
+	u_char *buf = (u_char *)_buf;
+	u_char *keystream;
+	size_t m;
+
+	_rs_stir_if_needed(n);
+	while (n > 0) {
+		if (rs->rs_have > 0) {
+			m = min(n, rs->rs_have);
+			keystream = rsx->rs_buf + sizeof(rsx->rs_buf)
+			    - rs->rs_have;
+			memcpy(buf, keystream, m);
+			memset(keystream, 0, m);
+			buf += m;
+			n -= m;
+			rs->rs_have -= m;
+		}
+		if (rs->rs_have == 0)
+			_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
+	}
+}
+
+static inline void
+_rs_random_u32(uint32_t *val)
+{
+	u_char *keystream;
+
+	_rs_stir_if_needed(sizeof(*val));
+	if (rs->rs_have < sizeof(*val))
+		_rs_rekey(NULL, 0);
+	keystream = rsx->rs_buf + sizeof(rsx->rs_buf) - rs->rs_have;
+	memcpy(val, keystream, sizeof(*val));
+	memset(keystream, 0, sizeof(*val));
+	rs->rs_have -= sizeof(*val);
+}
+
+uint32_t
+arc4random(void)
+{
+	uint32_t val;
+
+	_ARC4_LOCK();
+	_rs_random_u32(&val);
+	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
+	return val;
+}
+
+void
+arc4random_buf(void *buf, size_t n)
+{
+	_ARC4_LOCK();
+	_rs_random_buf(buf, n);
+	_ARC4_UNLOCK();
+}
diff --git a/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c b/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..1aa9a62
--- /dev/null
+++ b/libc/upstream-openbsd/lib/libc/crypt/arc4random_uniform.c
@@ -0,0 +1,56 @@
+/*	$OpenBSD: arc4random_uniform.c,v 1.1 2014/07/12 13:24:54 deraadt Exp $	*/
+
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2008, Damien Miller <djm@openbsd.org>
+ *
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
+ *
+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
+ */
+
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+
+/*
+ * Calculate a uniformly distributed random number less than upper_bound
+ * avoiding "modulo bias".
+ *
+ * Uniformity is achieved by generating new random numbers until the one
+ * returned is outside the range [0, 2**32 % upper_bound).  This
+ * guarantees the selected random number will be inside
+ * [2**32 % upper_bound, 2**32) which maps back to [0, upper_bound)
+ * after reduction modulo upper_bound.
+ */
+uint32_t
+arc4random_uniform(uint32_t upper_bound)
+{
+	uint32_t r, min;
+
+	if (upper_bound < 2)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* 2**32 % x == (2**32 - x) % x */
+	min = -upper_bound % upper_bound;
+
+	/*
+	 * This could theoretically loop forever but each retry has
+	 * p > 0.5 (worst case, usually far better) of selecting a
+	 * number inside the range we need, so it should rarely need
+	 * to re-roll.
+	 */
+	for (;;) {
+		r = arc4random();
+		if (r >= min)
+			break;
+	}
+
+	return r % upper_bound;
+}