diff --git a/Tethering/apex/Android.bp b/Tethering/apex/Android.bp
index 66efb8b..4c64e98 100644
--- a/Tethering/apex/Android.bp
+++ b/Tethering/apex/Android.bp
@@ -63,6 +63,7 @@
     ],
     canned_fs_config: "canned_fs_config",
     bpfs: [
+        "netd.o_mainline",
         "offload.o",
         "test.o",
     ],
diff --git a/bpf_progs/Android.bp b/bpf_progs/Android.bp
index d015ef6..4fa288b 100644
--- a/bpf_progs/Android.bp
+++ b/bpf_progs/Android.bp
@@ -71,3 +71,16 @@
         "-Werror",
     ],
 }
+
+bpf {
+    name: "netd.o_mainline",
+    srcs: ["netd.c"],
+    cflags: [
+        "-Wall",
+        "-Werror",
+    ],
+    include_dirs: [
+        "frameworks/libs/net/common/netd/libnetdutils/include",
+    ],
+    sub_dir: "net_shared",
+}
diff --git a/bpf_progs/netd.c b/bpf_progs/netd.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72ee431
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bpf_progs/netd.c
@@ -0,0 +1,392 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2018 The Android Open Source Project
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+ * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+ * You may obtain a copy of the License at
+ *
+ *      http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+ *
+ * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+ * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+ * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+ * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+ * limitations under the License.
+ */
+
+#include <bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/if.h>
+#include <linux/if_ether.h>
+#include <linux/if_packet.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/pkt_cls.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+#include "bpf_net_helpers.h"
+#include "bpf_shared.h"
+
+// This is defined for cgroup bpf filter only.
+#define BPF_DROP_UNLESS_DNS 2
+#define BPF_PASS 1
+#define BPF_DROP 0
+
+// This is used for xt_bpf program only.
+#define BPF_NOMATCH 0
+#define BPF_MATCH 1
+
+#define BPF_EGRESS 0
+#define BPF_INGRESS 1
+
+#define IP_PROTO_OFF offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol)
+#define IPV6_PROTO_OFF offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr)
+#define IPPROTO_IHL_OFF 0
+#define TCP_FLAG_OFF 13
+#define RST_OFFSET 2
+
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(cookie_tag_map, HASH, uint64_t, UidTagValue, COOKIE_UID_MAP_SIZE,
+                   AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(uid_counterset_map, HASH, uint32_t, uint8_t, UID_COUNTERSET_MAP_SIZE,
+                   AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(app_uid_stats_map, HASH, uint32_t, StatsValue, APP_STATS_MAP_SIZE,
+                   AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(stats_map_A, HASH, StatsKey, StatsValue, STATS_MAP_SIZE, AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(stats_map_B, HASH, StatsKey, StatsValue, STATS_MAP_SIZE, AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(iface_stats_map, HASH, uint32_t, StatsValue, IFACE_STATS_MAP_SIZE,
+                   AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(configuration_map, HASH, uint32_t, uint8_t, CONFIGURATION_MAP_SIZE,
+                   AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(uid_owner_map, HASH, uint32_t, UidOwnerValue, UID_OWNER_MAP_SIZE,
+                   AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(uid_permission_map, HASH, uint32_t, uint8_t, UID_OWNER_MAP_SIZE, AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+
+/* never actually used from ebpf */
+DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(iface_index_name_map, HASH, uint32_t, IfaceValue, IFACE_INDEX_NAME_MAP_SIZE,
+                   AID_NET_BW_ACCT)
+
+static __always_inline int is_system_uid(uint32_t uid) {
+    return (uid <= MAX_SYSTEM_UID) && (uid >= MIN_SYSTEM_UID);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Note: this blindly assumes an MTU of 1500, and that packets > MTU are always TCP,
+ * and that TCP is using the Linux default settings with TCP timestamp option enabled
+ * which uses 12 TCP option bytes per frame.
+ *
+ * These are not unreasonable assumptions:
+ *
+ * The internet does not really support MTUs greater than 1500, so most TCP traffic will
+ * be at that MTU, or slightly below it (worst case our upwards adjustment is too small).
+ *
+ * The chance our traffic isn't IP at all is basically zero, so the IP overhead correction
+ * is bound to be needed.
+ *
+ * Furthermore, the likelyhood that we're having to deal with GSO (ie. > MTU) packets that
+ * are not IP/TCP is pretty small (few other things are supported by Linux) and worse case
+ * our extra overhead will be slightly off, but probably still better than assuming none.
+ *
+ * Most servers are also Linux and thus support/default to using TCP timestamp option
+ * (and indeed TCP timestamp option comes from RFC 1323 titled "TCP Extensions for High
+ * Performance" which also defined TCP window scaling and are thus absolutely ancient...).
+ *
+ * All together this should be more correct than if we simply ignored GSO frames
+ * (ie. counted them as single packets with no extra overhead)
+ *
+ * Especially since the number of packets is important for any future clat offload correction.
+ * (which adjusts upward by 20 bytes per packet to account for ipv4 -> ipv6 header conversion)
+ */
+#define DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(the_stats_map, TypeOfKey)                                          \
+    static __always_inline inline void update_##the_stats_map(struct __sk_buff* skb,           \
+                                                              int direction, TypeOfKey* key) { \
+        StatsValue* value = bpf_##the_stats_map##_lookup_elem(key);                            \
+        if (!value) {                                                                          \
+            StatsValue newValue = {};                                                          \
+            bpf_##the_stats_map##_update_elem(key, &newValue, BPF_NOEXIST);                    \
+            value = bpf_##the_stats_map##_lookup_elem(key);                                    \
+        }                                                                                      \
+        if (value) {                                                                           \
+            const int mtu = 1500;                                                              \
+            uint64_t packets = 1;                                                              \
+            uint64_t bytes = skb->len;                                                         \
+            if (bytes > mtu) {                                                                 \
+                bool is_ipv6 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6));                           \
+                int ip_overhead = (is_ipv6 ? sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) : sizeof(struct iphdr));   \
+                int tcp_overhead = ip_overhead + sizeof(struct tcphdr) + 12;                   \
+                int mss = mtu - tcp_overhead;                                                  \
+                uint64_t payload = bytes - tcp_overhead;                                       \
+                packets = (payload + mss - 1) / mss;                                           \
+                bytes = tcp_overhead * packets + payload;                                      \
+            }                                                                                  \
+            if (direction == BPF_EGRESS) {                                                     \
+                __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->txPackets, packets);                              \
+                __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->txBytes, bytes);                                  \
+            } else if (direction == BPF_INGRESS) {                                             \
+                __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->rxPackets, packets);                              \
+                __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->rxBytes, bytes);                                  \
+            }                                                                                  \
+        }                                                                                      \
+    }
+
+DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(app_uid_stats_map, uint32_t)
+DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(iface_stats_map, uint32_t)
+DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(stats_map_A, StatsKey)
+DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(stats_map_B, StatsKey)
+
+static inline bool skip_owner_match(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
+    int offset = -1;
+    int ret = 0;
+    if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) {
+        offset = IP_PROTO_OFF;
+        uint8_t proto, ihl;
+        uint8_t flag;
+        ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, offset, &proto, 1);
+        if (!ret) {
+            if (proto == IPPROTO_ESP) {
+                return true;
+            } else if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
+                ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, IPPROTO_IHL_OFF, &ihl, 1);
+                ihl = ihl & 0x0F;
+                ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, ihl * 4 + TCP_FLAG_OFF, &flag, 1);
+                if (ret == 0 && (flag >> RST_OFFSET & 1)) {
+                    return true;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) {
+        offset = IPV6_PROTO_OFF;
+        uint8_t proto;
+        ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, offset, &proto, 1);
+        if (!ret) {
+            if (proto == IPPROTO_ESP) {
+                return true;
+            } else if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP) {
+                uint8_t flag;
+                ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + TCP_FLAG_OFF, &flag, 1);
+                if (ret == 0 && (flag >> RST_OFFSET & 1)) {
+                    return true;
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+
+static __always_inline BpfConfig getConfig(uint32_t configKey) {
+    uint32_t mapSettingKey = configKey;
+    BpfConfig* config = bpf_configuration_map_lookup_elem(&mapSettingKey);
+    if (!config) {
+        // Couldn't read configuration entry. Assume everything is disabled.
+        return DEFAULT_CONFIG;
+    }
+    return *config;
+}
+
+static inline int bpf_owner_match(struct __sk_buff* skb, uint32_t uid, int direction) {
+    if (skip_owner_match(skb)) return BPF_PASS;
+
+    if (is_system_uid(uid)) return BPF_PASS;
+
+    BpfConfig enabledRules = getConfig(UID_RULES_CONFIGURATION_KEY);
+
+    UidOwnerValue* uidEntry = bpf_uid_owner_map_lookup_elem(&uid);
+    uint8_t uidRules = uidEntry ? uidEntry->rule : 0;
+    uint32_t allowed_iif = uidEntry ? uidEntry->iif : 0;
+
+    if (enabledRules) {
+        if ((enabledRules & DOZABLE_MATCH) && !(uidRules & DOZABLE_MATCH)) {
+            return BPF_DROP;
+        }
+        if ((enabledRules & STANDBY_MATCH) && (uidRules & STANDBY_MATCH)) {
+            return BPF_DROP;
+        }
+        if ((enabledRules & POWERSAVE_MATCH) && !(uidRules & POWERSAVE_MATCH)) {
+            return BPF_DROP;
+        }
+        if ((enabledRules & RESTRICTED_MATCH) && !(uidRules & RESTRICTED_MATCH)) {
+            return BPF_DROP;
+        }
+    }
+    if (direction == BPF_INGRESS && (uidRules & IIF_MATCH)) {
+        // Drops packets not coming from lo nor the allowlisted interface
+        if (allowed_iif && skb->ifindex != 1 && skb->ifindex != allowed_iif) {
+            return BPF_DROP_UNLESS_DNS;
+        }
+    }
+    return BPF_PASS;
+}
+
+static __always_inline inline void update_stats_with_config(struct __sk_buff* skb, int direction,
+                                                            StatsKey* key, uint8_t selectedMap) {
+    if (selectedMap == SELECT_MAP_A) {
+        update_stats_map_A(skb, direction, key);
+    } else if (selectedMap == SELECT_MAP_B) {
+        update_stats_map_B(skb, direction, key);
+    }
+}
+
+static __always_inline inline int bpf_traffic_account(struct __sk_buff* skb, int direction) {
+    uint32_t sock_uid = bpf_get_socket_uid(skb);
+    uint64_t cookie = bpf_get_socket_cookie(skb);
+    UidTagValue* utag = bpf_cookie_tag_map_lookup_elem(&cookie);
+    uint32_t uid, tag;
+    if (utag) {
+        uid = utag->uid;
+        tag = utag->tag;
+    } else {
+        uid = sock_uid;
+        tag = 0;
+    }
+
+    // Always allow and never count clat traffic. Only the IPv4 traffic on the stacked
+    // interface is accounted for and subject to usage restrictions.
+    // TODO: remove sock_uid check once Nat464Xlat javaland adds the socket tag AID_CLAT for clat.
+    if (sock_uid == AID_CLAT || uid == AID_CLAT) {
+        return BPF_PASS;
+    }
+
+    int match = bpf_owner_match(skb, sock_uid, direction);
+    if ((direction == BPF_EGRESS) && (match == BPF_DROP)) {
+        // If an outbound packet is going to be dropped, we do not count that
+        // traffic.
+        return match;
+    }
+
+// Workaround for secureVPN with VpnIsolation enabled, refer to b/159994981 for details.
+// Keep TAG_SYSTEM_DNS in sync with DnsResolver/include/netd_resolv/resolv.h
+// and TrafficStatsConstants.java
+#define TAG_SYSTEM_DNS 0xFFFFFF82
+    if (tag == TAG_SYSTEM_DNS && uid == AID_DNS) {
+        uid = sock_uid;
+        if (match == BPF_DROP_UNLESS_DNS) match = BPF_PASS;
+    } else {
+        if (match == BPF_DROP_UNLESS_DNS) match = BPF_DROP;
+    }
+
+    StatsKey key = {.uid = uid, .tag = tag, .counterSet = 0, .ifaceIndex = skb->ifindex};
+
+    uint8_t* counterSet = bpf_uid_counterset_map_lookup_elem(&uid);
+    if (counterSet) key.counterSet = (uint32_t)*counterSet;
+
+    uint32_t mapSettingKey = CURRENT_STATS_MAP_CONFIGURATION_KEY;
+    uint8_t* selectedMap = bpf_configuration_map_lookup_elem(&mapSettingKey);
+
+    // Use asm("%0 &= 1" : "+r"(match)) before return match,
+    // to help kernel's bpf verifier, so that it can be 100% certain
+    // that the returned value is always BPF_NOMATCH(0) or BPF_MATCH(1).
+    if (!selectedMap) {
+        asm("%0 &= 1" : "+r"(match));
+        return match;
+    }
+
+    if (key.tag) {
+        update_stats_with_config(skb, direction, &key, *selectedMap);
+        key.tag = 0;
+    }
+
+    update_stats_with_config(skb, direction, &key, *selectedMap);
+    update_app_uid_stats_map(skb, direction, &uid);
+    asm("%0 &= 1" : "+r"(match));
+    return match;
+}
+
+DEFINE_BPF_PROG("cgroupskb/ingress/stats", AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, bpf_cgroup_ingress)
+(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
+    return bpf_traffic_account(skb, BPF_INGRESS);
+}
+
+DEFINE_BPF_PROG("cgroupskb/egress/stats", AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, bpf_cgroup_egress)
+(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
+    return bpf_traffic_account(skb, BPF_EGRESS);
+}
+
+DEFINE_BPF_PROG("skfilter/egress/xtbpf", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, xt_bpf_egress_prog)
+(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
+    // Clat daemon does not generate new traffic, all its traffic is accounted for already
+    // on the v4-* interfaces (except for the 20 (or 28) extra bytes of IPv6 vs IPv4 overhead,
+    // but that can be corrected for later when merging v4-foo stats into interface foo's).
+    // TODO: remove sock_uid check once Nat464Xlat javaland adds the socket tag AID_CLAT for clat.
+    uint32_t sock_uid = bpf_get_socket_uid(skb);
+    if (sock_uid == AID_CLAT) return BPF_NOMATCH;
+    if (sock_uid == AID_SYSTEM) {
+        uint64_t cookie = bpf_get_socket_cookie(skb);
+        UidTagValue* utag = bpf_cookie_tag_map_lookup_elem(&cookie);
+        if (utag && utag->uid == AID_CLAT) return BPF_NOMATCH;
+    }
+
+    uint32_t key = skb->ifindex;
+    update_iface_stats_map(skb, BPF_EGRESS, &key);
+    return BPF_MATCH;
+}
+
+DEFINE_BPF_PROG("skfilter/ingress/xtbpf", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, xt_bpf_ingress_prog)
+(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
+    // Clat daemon traffic is not accounted by virtue of iptables raw prerouting drop rule
+    // (in clat_raw_PREROUTING chain), which triggers before this (in bw_raw_PREROUTING chain).
+    // It will be accounted for on the v4-* clat interface instead.
+    // Keep that in mind when moving this out of iptables xt_bpf and into tc ingress (or xdp).
+
+    uint32_t key = skb->ifindex;
+    update_iface_stats_map(skb, BPF_INGRESS, &key);
+    return BPF_MATCH;
+}
+
+DEFINE_BPF_PROG("schedact/ingress/account", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, tc_bpf_ingress_account_prog)
+(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
+    // Account for ingress traffic before tc drops it.
+    uint32_t key = skb->ifindex;
+    update_iface_stats_map(skb, BPF_INGRESS, &key);
+    return TC_ACT_UNSPEC;
+}
+
+DEFINE_BPF_PROG("skfilter/allowlist/xtbpf", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, xt_bpf_allowlist_prog)
+(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
+    uint32_t sock_uid = bpf_get_socket_uid(skb);
+    if (is_system_uid(sock_uid)) return BPF_MATCH;
+
+    // 65534 is the overflow 'nobody' uid, usually this being returned means
+    // that skb->sk is NULL during RX (early decap socket lookup failure),
+    // which commonly happens for incoming packets to an unconnected udp socket.
+    // Additionally bpf_get_socket_cookie() returns 0 if skb->sk is NULL
+    if ((sock_uid == 65534) && !bpf_get_socket_cookie(skb) && is_received_skb(skb))
+        return BPF_MATCH;
+
+    UidOwnerValue* allowlistMatch = bpf_uid_owner_map_lookup_elem(&sock_uid);
+    if (allowlistMatch) return allowlistMatch->rule & HAPPY_BOX_MATCH ? BPF_MATCH : BPF_NOMATCH;
+    return BPF_NOMATCH;
+}
+
+DEFINE_BPF_PROG("skfilter/denylist/xtbpf", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, xt_bpf_denylist_prog)
+(struct __sk_buff* skb) {
+    uint32_t sock_uid = bpf_get_socket_uid(skb);
+    UidOwnerValue* denylistMatch = bpf_uid_owner_map_lookup_elem(&sock_uid);
+    if (denylistMatch) return denylistMatch->rule & PENALTY_BOX_MATCH ? BPF_MATCH : BPF_NOMATCH;
+    return BPF_NOMATCH;
+}
+
+DEFINE_BPF_PROG_KVER("cgroupsock/inet/create", AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, inet_socket_create,
+                     KVER(4, 14, 0))
+(struct bpf_sock* sk) {
+    uint64_t gid_uid = bpf_get_current_uid_gid();
+    /*
+     * A given app is guaranteed to have the same app ID in all the profiles in
+     * which it is installed, and install permission is granted to app for all
+     * user at install time so we only check the appId part of a request uid at
+     * run time. See UserHandle#isSameApp for detail.
+     */
+    uint32_t appId = (gid_uid & 0xffffffff) % PER_USER_RANGE;
+    uint8_t* permissions = bpf_uid_permission_map_lookup_elem(&appId);
+    if (!permissions) {
+        // UID not in map. Default to just INTERNET permission.
+        return 1;
+    }
+
+    // A return value of 1 means allow, everything else means deny.
+    return (*permissions & BPF_PERMISSION_INTERNET) == BPF_PERMISSION_INTERNET;
+}
+
+LICENSE("Apache 2.0");
+CRITICAL("netd");