Don't verify payload signatures in recovery
Change-Id: I0ce626ef993c2a7c87e03f705ef2e866a3391db1
diff --git a/payload_consumer/delta_performer.cc b/payload_consumer/delta_performer.cc
index a57169b..7acedaf 100644
--- a/payload_consumer/delta_performer.cc
+++ b/payload_consumer/delta_performer.cc
@@ -361,12 +361,15 @@
if (perform_verification) {
return MetadataParseResult::kError;
}
- } else {
+ }
+#ifndef __ANDROID_RECOVERY__
+ else {
// We have the full metadata in |payload|. Verify its integrity
// and authenticity based on the information we have in Omaha response.
*error = payload_metadata_.ValidateMetadataSignature(
payload, payload_->metadata_signature, *payload_verifier);
}
+#endif
if (*error != ErrorCode::kSuccess) {
if (install_plan_->hash_checks_mandatory) {
// The autoupdate_CatchBadSignatures test checks for this string
@@ -1297,12 +1300,14 @@
TEST_AND_RETURN_VAL(ErrorCode::kDownloadPayloadPubKeyVerificationError,
hash_data.size() == kSHA256Size);
+#ifndef __ANDROID_RECOVERY__
if (!payload_verifier->VerifySignature(signatures_message_data_, hash_data)) {
// The autoupdate_CatchBadSignatures test checks for this string
// in log-files. Keep in sync.
LOG(ERROR) << "Public key verification failed, thus update failed.";
return ErrorCode::kDownloadPayloadPubKeyVerificationError;
}
+#endif
LOG(INFO) << "Payload hash matches value in payload.";
return ErrorCode::kSuccess;