diff --git a/sepolicy/file_contexts b/sepolicy/file_contexts
index 3e91ace..7cffe51 100644
--- a/sepolicy/file_contexts
+++ b/sepolicy/file_contexts
@@ -15,9 +15,5 @@
 /data/misc/radio(/.*)?      u:object_r:radio_data_file:s0
 
 #############
-# Superuser's control sockets
-/dev/com.android.settings.daemon(/.*)?   u:object_r:superuser_device:s0
-/dev/com.android.settings(/.*)?   u:object_r:superuser_device:s0
-
 # Expansion of these hooks is a bit unconventional
 /cache/com.cyanogenmod.keyhandler.dex   u:object_r:dalvikcache_data_file:s0
diff --git a/sepolicy/sepolicy.mk b/sepolicy/sepolicy.mk
index 2eb8b9e..b43476b 100644
--- a/sepolicy/sepolicy.mk
+++ b/sepolicy/sepolicy.mk
@@ -20,7 +20,6 @@
     netd.te \
     property.te \
     shell.te \
-    su.te \
     sysinit.te \
     system.te \
     ueventd.te \
diff --git a/sepolicy/su.te b/sepolicy/su.te
deleted file mode 100644
index 8e63b2f..0000000
--- a/sepolicy/su.te
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-type superuser_device, file_type;
-
-## Perms for the daemon
-
-type sudaemon, domain;
-
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  domain_trans(init, su_exec, sudaemon)
-  # The userspace app uses /dev sockets to control per-app access
-  allow sudaemon superuser_device:dir { create rw_dir_perms setattr unlink };
-  allow sudaemon superuser_device:sock_file { create setattr unlink write };
-
-  # sudaemon is also permissive to permit setenforce.
-  permissive sudaemon;
-
-  # Add sudaemon to various domains
-  net_domain(sudaemon)
-  app_domain(sudaemon)
-
-  dontaudit sudaemon self:capability_class_set *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon kernel:security *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon kernel:system *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon self:memprotect *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:process *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:fd *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:dir *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:lnk_file *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:{ fifo_file file } *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:socket_class_set *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:ipc_class_set *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:key *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon fs_type:filesystem *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon {fs_type dev_type file_type}:dir_file_class_set *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon node_type:node *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon netif_type:netif *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon port_type:socket_class_set *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon port_type:{ tcp_socket dccp_socket } *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:peer *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon domain:binder *;
-  dontaudit sudaemon property_type:property_service *;
-')
-
-## Perms for the app
-
-userdebug_or_eng(`
-  # Translate user apps to the shell domain when using su
-  #
-  # PR_SET_NO_NEW_PRIVS blocks this :(
-  # we need to find a way to narrow this down to the actual exec.
-  # typealias shell alias suclient;
-  # domain_auto_trans(untrusted_app, su_exec, suclient)
-
-  allow untrusted_app su_exec:file { execute_no_trans getattr open read execute };
-  allow untrusted_app sudaemon:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write setopt ioctl };
-  allow untrusted_app superuser_device:dir { r_dir_perms };
-  allow untrusted_app superuser_device:sock_file { write };
-
-
-  # For Settings control of access
-  allow system_app superuser_device:sock_file { read write create setattr unlink getattr };
-  allow system_app sudaemon:unix_stream_socket { connectto read write setopt ioctl };
-  allow system_app superuser_device:dir { create rw_dir_perms setattr unlink };
-')