Ken Chen | 587d423 | 2022-01-17 17:18:43 +0800 | [diff] [blame] | 1 | /* |
| 2 | * Copyright (C) 2018 The Android Open Source Project |
| 3 | * |
| 4 | * Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License"); |
| 5 | * you may not use this file except in compliance with the License. |
| 6 | * You may obtain a copy of the License at |
| 7 | * |
| 8 | * http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0 |
| 9 | * |
| 10 | * Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software |
| 11 | * distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS, |
| 12 | * WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied. |
| 13 | * See the License for the specific language governing permissions and |
| 14 | * limitations under the License. |
| 15 | */ |
| 16 | |
| 17 | #include <bpf_helpers.h> |
| 18 | #include <linux/bpf.h> |
| 19 | #include <linux/if.h> |
| 20 | #include <linux/if_ether.h> |
| 21 | #include <linux/if_packet.h> |
| 22 | #include <linux/in.h> |
| 23 | #include <linux/in6.h> |
| 24 | #include <linux/ip.h> |
| 25 | #include <linux/ipv6.h> |
| 26 | #include <linux/pkt_cls.h> |
| 27 | #include <linux/tcp.h> |
Ken Chen | f426b2b | 2022-01-23 15:39:13 +0800 | [diff] [blame] | 28 | #include <netdutils/UidConstants.h> |
Ken Chen | 587d423 | 2022-01-17 17:18:43 +0800 | [diff] [blame] | 29 | #include <stdbool.h> |
| 30 | #include <stdint.h> |
| 31 | #include "bpf_net_helpers.h" |
| 32 | #include "bpf_shared.h" |
| 33 | |
| 34 | // This is defined for cgroup bpf filter only. |
| 35 | #define BPF_DROP_UNLESS_DNS 2 |
| 36 | #define BPF_PASS 1 |
| 37 | #define BPF_DROP 0 |
| 38 | |
| 39 | // This is used for xt_bpf program only. |
| 40 | #define BPF_NOMATCH 0 |
| 41 | #define BPF_MATCH 1 |
| 42 | |
| 43 | #define BPF_EGRESS 0 |
| 44 | #define BPF_INGRESS 1 |
| 45 | |
| 46 | #define IP_PROTO_OFF offsetof(struct iphdr, protocol) |
| 47 | #define IPV6_PROTO_OFF offsetof(struct ipv6hdr, nexthdr) |
| 48 | #define IPPROTO_IHL_OFF 0 |
| 49 | #define TCP_FLAG_OFF 13 |
| 50 | #define RST_OFFSET 2 |
| 51 | |
| 52 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(cookie_tag_map, HASH, uint64_t, UidTagValue, COOKIE_UID_MAP_SIZE, |
| 53 | AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 54 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(uid_counterset_map, HASH, uint32_t, uint8_t, UID_COUNTERSET_MAP_SIZE, |
| 55 | AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 56 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(app_uid_stats_map, HASH, uint32_t, StatsValue, APP_STATS_MAP_SIZE, |
| 57 | AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 58 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(stats_map_A, HASH, StatsKey, StatsValue, STATS_MAP_SIZE, AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 59 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(stats_map_B, HASH, StatsKey, StatsValue, STATS_MAP_SIZE, AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 60 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(iface_stats_map, HASH, uint32_t, StatsValue, IFACE_STATS_MAP_SIZE, |
| 61 | AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 62 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(configuration_map, HASH, uint32_t, uint8_t, CONFIGURATION_MAP_SIZE, |
| 63 | AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 64 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(uid_owner_map, HASH, uint32_t, UidOwnerValue, UID_OWNER_MAP_SIZE, |
| 65 | AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 66 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(uid_permission_map, HASH, uint32_t, uint8_t, UID_OWNER_MAP_SIZE, AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 67 | |
| 68 | /* never actually used from ebpf */ |
| 69 | DEFINE_BPF_MAP_GRW(iface_index_name_map, HASH, uint32_t, IfaceValue, IFACE_INDEX_NAME_MAP_SIZE, |
| 70 | AID_NET_BW_ACCT) |
| 71 | |
| 72 | static __always_inline int is_system_uid(uint32_t uid) { |
| 73 | return (uid <= MAX_SYSTEM_UID) && (uid >= MIN_SYSTEM_UID); |
| 74 | } |
| 75 | |
| 76 | /* |
| 77 | * Note: this blindly assumes an MTU of 1500, and that packets > MTU are always TCP, |
| 78 | * and that TCP is using the Linux default settings with TCP timestamp option enabled |
| 79 | * which uses 12 TCP option bytes per frame. |
| 80 | * |
| 81 | * These are not unreasonable assumptions: |
| 82 | * |
| 83 | * The internet does not really support MTUs greater than 1500, so most TCP traffic will |
| 84 | * be at that MTU, or slightly below it (worst case our upwards adjustment is too small). |
| 85 | * |
| 86 | * The chance our traffic isn't IP at all is basically zero, so the IP overhead correction |
| 87 | * is bound to be needed. |
| 88 | * |
| 89 | * Furthermore, the likelyhood that we're having to deal with GSO (ie. > MTU) packets that |
| 90 | * are not IP/TCP is pretty small (few other things are supported by Linux) and worse case |
| 91 | * our extra overhead will be slightly off, but probably still better than assuming none. |
| 92 | * |
| 93 | * Most servers are also Linux and thus support/default to using TCP timestamp option |
| 94 | * (and indeed TCP timestamp option comes from RFC 1323 titled "TCP Extensions for High |
| 95 | * Performance" which also defined TCP window scaling and are thus absolutely ancient...). |
| 96 | * |
| 97 | * All together this should be more correct than if we simply ignored GSO frames |
| 98 | * (ie. counted them as single packets with no extra overhead) |
| 99 | * |
| 100 | * Especially since the number of packets is important for any future clat offload correction. |
| 101 | * (which adjusts upward by 20 bytes per packet to account for ipv4 -> ipv6 header conversion) |
| 102 | */ |
| 103 | #define DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(the_stats_map, TypeOfKey) \ |
| 104 | static __always_inline inline void update_##the_stats_map(struct __sk_buff* skb, \ |
| 105 | int direction, TypeOfKey* key) { \ |
| 106 | StatsValue* value = bpf_##the_stats_map##_lookup_elem(key); \ |
| 107 | if (!value) { \ |
| 108 | StatsValue newValue = {}; \ |
| 109 | bpf_##the_stats_map##_update_elem(key, &newValue, BPF_NOEXIST); \ |
| 110 | value = bpf_##the_stats_map##_lookup_elem(key); \ |
| 111 | } \ |
| 112 | if (value) { \ |
| 113 | const int mtu = 1500; \ |
| 114 | uint64_t packets = 1; \ |
| 115 | uint64_t bytes = skb->len; \ |
| 116 | if (bytes > mtu) { \ |
| 117 | bool is_ipv6 = (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)); \ |
| 118 | int ip_overhead = (is_ipv6 ? sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) : sizeof(struct iphdr)); \ |
| 119 | int tcp_overhead = ip_overhead + sizeof(struct tcphdr) + 12; \ |
| 120 | int mss = mtu - tcp_overhead; \ |
| 121 | uint64_t payload = bytes - tcp_overhead; \ |
| 122 | packets = (payload + mss - 1) / mss; \ |
| 123 | bytes = tcp_overhead * packets + payload; \ |
| 124 | } \ |
| 125 | if (direction == BPF_EGRESS) { \ |
| 126 | __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->txPackets, packets); \ |
| 127 | __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->txBytes, bytes); \ |
| 128 | } else if (direction == BPF_INGRESS) { \ |
| 129 | __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->rxPackets, packets); \ |
| 130 | __sync_fetch_and_add(&value->rxBytes, bytes); \ |
| 131 | } \ |
| 132 | } \ |
| 133 | } |
| 134 | |
| 135 | DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(app_uid_stats_map, uint32_t) |
| 136 | DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(iface_stats_map, uint32_t) |
| 137 | DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(stats_map_A, StatsKey) |
| 138 | DEFINE_UPDATE_STATS(stats_map_B, StatsKey) |
| 139 | |
| 140 | static inline bool skip_owner_match(struct __sk_buff* skb) { |
| 141 | int offset = -1; |
| 142 | int ret = 0; |
| 143 | if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) { |
| 144 | offset = IP_PROTO_OFF; |
| 145 | uint8_t proto, ihl; |
| 146 | uint8_t flag; |
| 147 | ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, offset, &proto, 1); |
| 148 | if (!ret) { |
| 149 | if (proto == IPPROTO_ESP) { |
| 150 | return true; |
| 151 | } else if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP) { |
| 152 | ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, IPPROTO_IHL_OFF, &ihl, 1); |
| 153 | ihl = ihl & 0x0F; |
| 154 | ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, ihl * 4 + TCP_FLAG_OFF, &flag, 1); |
| 155 | if (ret == 0 && (flag >> RST_OFFSET & 1)) { |
| 156 | return true; |
| 157 | } |
| 158 | } |
| 159 | } |
| 160 | } else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6)) { |
| 161 | offset = IPV6_PROTO_OFF; |
| 162 | uint8_t proto; |
| 163 | ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, offset, &proto, 1); |
| 164 | if (!ret) { |
| 165 | if (proto == IPPROTO_ESP) { |
| 166 | return true; |
| 167 | } else if (proto == IPPROTO_TCP) { |
| 168 | uint8_t flag; |
| 169 | ret = bpf_skb_load_bytes(skb, sizeof(struct ipv6hdr) + TCP_FLAG_OFF, &flag, 1); |
| 170 | if (ret == 0 && (flag >> RST_OFFSET & 1)) { |
| 171 | return true; |
| 172 | } |
| 173 | } |
| 174 | } |
| 175 | } |
| 176 | return false; |
| 177 | } |
| 178 | |
| 179 | static __always_inline BpfConfig getConfig(uint32_t configKey) { |
| 180 | uint32_t mapSettingKey = configKey; |
| 181 | BpfConfig* config = bpf_configuration_map_lookup_elem(&mapSettingKey); |
| 182 | if (!config) { |
| 183 | // Couldn't read configuration entry. Assume everything is disabled. |
| 184 | return DEFAULT_CONFIG; |
| 185 | } |
| 186 | return *config; |
| 187 | } |
| 188 | |
| 189 | static inline int bpf_owner_match(struct __sk_buff* skb, uint32_t uid, int direction) { |
| 190 | if (skip_owner_match(skb)) return BPF_PASS; |
| 191 | |
| 192 | if (is_system_uid(uid)) return BPF_PASS; |
| 193 | |
| 194 | BpfConfig enabledRules = getConfig(UID_RULES_CONFIGURATION_KEY); |
| 195 | |
| 196 | UidOwnerValue* uidEntry = bpf_uid_owner_map_lookup_elem(&uid); |
| 197 | uint8_t uidRules = uidEntry ? uidEntry->rule : 0; |
| 198 | uint32_t allowed_iif = uidEntry ? uidEntry->iif : 0; |
| 199 | |
| 200 | if (enabledRules) { |
| 201 | if ((enabledRules & DOZABLE_MATCH) && !(uidRules & DOZABLE_MATCH)) { |
| 202 | return BPF_DROP; |
| 203 | } |
| 204 | if ((enabledRules & STANDBY_MATCH) && (uidRules & STANDBY_MATCH)) { |
| 205 | return BPF_DROP; |
| 206 | } |
| 207 | if ((enabledRules & POWERSAVE_MATCH) && !(uidRules & POWERSAVE_MATCH)) { |
| 208 | return BPF_DROP; |
| 209 | } |
| 210 | if ((enabledRules & RESTRICTED_MATCH) && !(uidRules & RESTRICTED_MATCH)) { |
| 211 | return BPF_DROP; |
| 212 | } |
| 213 | } |
| 214 | if (direction == BPF_INGRESS && (uidRules & IIF_MATCH)) { |
| 215 | // Drops packets not coming from lo nor the allowlisted interface |
| 216 | if (allowed_iif && skb->ifindex != 1 && skb->ifindex != allowed_iif) { |
| 217 | return BPF_DROP_UNLESS_DNS; |
| 218 | } |
| 219 | } |
| 220 | return BPF_PASS; |
| 221 | } |
| 222 | |
| 223 | static __always_inline inline void update_stats_with_config(struct __sk_buff* skb, int direction, |
| 224 | StatsKey* key, uint8_t selectedMap) { |
| 225 | if (selectedMap == SELECT_MAP_A) { |
| 226 | update_stats_map_A(skb, direction, key); |
| 227 | } else if (selectedMap == SELECT_MAP_B) { |
| 228 | update_stats_map_B(skb, direction, key); |
| 229 | } |
| 230 | } |
| 231 | |
| 232 | static __always_inline inline int bpf_traffic_account(struct __sk_buff* skb, int direction) { |
| 233 | uint32_t sock_uid = bpf_get_socket_uid(skb); |
| 234 | uint64_t cookie = bpf_get_socket_cookie(skb); |
| 235 | UidTagValue* utag = bpf_cookie_tag_map_lookup_elem(&cookie); |
| 236 | uint32_t uid, tag; |
| 237 | if (utag) { |
| 238 | uid = utag->uid; |
| 239 | tag = utag->tag; |
| 240 | } else { |
| 241 | uid = sock_uid; |
| 242 | tag = 0; |
| 243 | } |
| 244 | |
| 245 | // Always allow and never count clat traffic. Only the IPv4 traffic on the stacked |
| 246 | // interface is accounted for and subject to usage restrictions. |
| 247 | // TODO: remove sock_uid check once Nat464Xlat javaland adds the socket tag AID_CLAT for clat. |
| 248 | if (sock_uid == AID_CLAT || uid == AID_CLAT) { |
| 249 | return BPF_PASS; |
| 250 | } |
| 251 | |
| 252 | int match = bpf_owner_match(skb, sock_uid, direction); |
| 253 | if ((direction == BPF_EGRESS) && (match == BPF_DROP)) { |
| 254 | // If an outbound packet is going to be dropped, we do not count that |
| 255 | // traffic. |
| 256 | return match; |
| 257 | } |
| 258 | |
| 259 | // Workaround for secureVPN with VpnIsolation enabled, refer to b/159994981 for details. |
| 260 | // Keep TAG_SYSTEM_DNS in sync with DnsResolver/include/netd_resolv/resolv.h |
| 261 | // and TrafficStatsConstants.java |
| 262 | #define TAG_SYSTEM_DNS 0xFFFFFF82 |
| 263 | if (tag == TAG_SYSTEM_DNS && uid == AID_DNS) { |
| 264 | uid = sock_uid; |
| 265 | if (match == BPF_DROP_UNLESS_DNS) match = BPF_PASS; |
| 266 | } else { |
| 267 | if (match == BPF_DROP_UNLESS_DNS) match = BPF_DROP; |
| 268 | } |
| 269 | |
| 270 | StatsKey key = {.uid = uid, .tag = tag, .counterSet = 0, .ifaceIndex = skb->ifindex}; |
| 271 | |
| 272 | uint8_t* counterSet = bpf_uid_counterset_map_lookup_elem(&uid); |
| 273 | if (counterSet) key.counterSet = (uint32_t)*counterSet; |
| 274 | |
| 275 | uint32_t mapSettingKey = CURRENT_STATS_MAP_CONFIGURATION_KEY; |
| 276 | uint8_t* selectedMap = bpf_configuration_map_lookup_elem(&mapSettingKey); |
| 277 | |
| 278 | // Use asm("%0 &= 1" : "+r"(match)) before return match, |
| 279 | // to help kernel's bpf verifier, so that it can be 100% certain |
| 280 | // that the returned value is always BPF_NOMATCH(0) or BPF_MATCH(1). |
| 281 | if (!selectedMap) { |
| 282 | asm("%0 &= 1" : "+r"(match)); |
| 283 | return match; |
| 284 | } |
| 285 | |
| 286 | if (key.tag) { |
| 287 | update_stats_with_config(skb, direction, &key, *selectedMap); |
| 288 | key.tag = 0; |
| 289 | } |
| 290 | |
| 291 | update_stats_with_config(skb, direction, &key, *selectedMap); |
| 292 | update_app_uid_stats_map(skb, direction, &uid); |
| 293 | asm("%0 &= 1" : "+r"(match)); |
| 294 | return match; |
| 295 | } |
| 296 | |
| 297 | DEFINE_BPF_PROG("cgroupskb/ingress/stats", AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, bpf_cgroup_ingress) |
| 298 | (struct __sk_buff* skb) { |
| 299 | return bpf_traffic_account(skb, BPF_INGRESS); |
| 300 | } |
| 301 | |
| 302 | DEFINE_BPF_PROG("cgroupskb/egress/stats", AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, bpf_cgroup_egress) |
| 303 | (struct __sk_buff* skb) { |
| 304 | return bpf_traffic_account(skb, BPF_EGRESS); |
| 305 | } |
| 306 | |
| 307 | DEFINE_BPF_PROG("skfilter/egress/xtbpf", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, xt_bpf_egress_prog) |
| 308 | (struct __sk_buff* skb) { |
| 309 | // Clat daemon does not generate new traffic, all its traffic is accounted for already |
| 310 | // on the v4-* interfaces (except for the 20 (or 28) extra bytes of IPv6 vs IPv4 overhead, |
| 311 | // but that can be corrected for later when merging v4-foo stats into interface foo's). |
| 312 | // TODO: remove sock_uid check once Nat464Xlat javaland adds the socket tag AID_CLAT for clat. |
| 313 | uint32_t sock_uid = bpf_get_socket_uid(skb); |
| 314 | if (sock_uid == AID_CLAT) return BPF_NOMATCH; |
| 315 | if (sock_uid == AID_SYSTEM) { |
| 316 | uint64_t cookie = bpf_get_socket_cookie(skb); |
| 317 | UidTagValue* utag = bpf_cookie_tag_map_lookup_elem(&cookie); |
| 318 | if (utag && utag->uid == AID_CLAT) return BPF_NOMATCH; |
| 319 | } |
| 320 | |
| 321 | uint32_t key = skb->ifindex; |
| 322 | update_iface_stats_map(skb, BPF_EGRESS, &key); |
| 323 | return BPF_MATCH; |
| 324 | } |
| 325 | |
| 326 | DEFINE_BPF_PROG("skfilter/ingress/xtbpf", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, xt_bpf_ingress_prog) |
| 327 | (struct __sk_buff* skb) { |
| 328 | // Clat daemon traffic is not accounted by virtue of iptables raw prerouting drop rule |
| 329 | // (in clat_raw_PREROUTING chain), which triggers before this (in bw_raw_PREROUTING chain). |
| 330 | // It will be accounted for on the v4-* clat interface instead. |
| 331 | // Keep that in mind when moving this out of iptables xt_bpf and into tc ingress (or xdp). |
| 332 | |
| 333 | uint32_t key = skb->ifindex; |
| 334 | update_iface_stats_map(skb, BPF_INGRESS, &key); |
| 335 | return BPF_MATCH; |
| 336 | } |
| 337 | |
| 338 | DEFINE_BPF_PROG("schedact/ingress/account", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, tc_bpf_ingress_account_prog) |
| 339 | (struct __sk_buff* skb) { |
| 340 | // Account for ingress traffic before tc drops it. |
| 341 | uint32_t key = skb->ifindex; |
| 342 | update_iface_stats_map(skb, BPF_INGRESS, &key); |
| 343 | return TC_ACT_UNSPEC; |
| 344 | } |
| 345 | |
| 346 | DEFINE_BPF_PROG("skfilter/allowlist/xtbpf", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, xt_bpf_allowlist_prog) |
| 347 | (struct __sk_buff* skb) { |
| 348 | uint32_t sock_uid = bpf_get_socket_uid(skb); |
| 349 | if (is_system_uid(sock_uid)) return BPF_MATCH; |
| 350 | |
| 351 | // 65534 is the overflow 'nobody' uid, usually this being returned means |
| 352 | // that skb->sk is NULL during RX (early decap socket lookup failure), |
| 353 | // which commonly happens for incoming packets to an unconnected udp socket. |
| 354 | // Additionally bpf_get_socket_cookie() returns 0 if skb->sk is NULL |
| 355 | if ((sock_uid == 65534) && !bpf_get_socket_cookie(skb) && is_received_skb(skb)) |
| 356 | return BPF_MATCH; |
| 357 | |
| 358 | UidOwnerValue* allowlistMatch = bpf_uid_owner_map_lookup_elem(&sock_uid); |
| 359 | if (allowlistMatch) return allowlistMatch->rule & HAPPY_BOX_MATCH ? BPF_MATCH : BPF_NOMATCH; |
| 360 | return BPF_NOMATCH; |
| 361 | } |
| 362 | |
| 363 | DEFINE_BPF_PROG("skfilter/denylist/xtbpf", AID_ROOT, AID_NET_ADMIN, xt_bpf_denylist_prog) |
| 364 | (struct __sk_buff* skb) { |
| 365 | uint32_t sock_uid = bpf_get_socket_uid(skb); |
| 366 | UidOwnerValue* denylistMatch = bpf_uid_owner_map_lookup_elem(&sock_uid); |
| 367 | if (denylistMatch) return denylistMatch->rule & PENALTY_BOX_MATCH ? BPF_MATCH : BPF_NOMATCH; |
| 368 | return BPF_NOMATCH; |
| 369 | } |
| 370 | |
| 371 | DEFINE_BPF_PROG_KVER("cgroupsock/inet/create", AID_ROOT, AID_ROOT, inet_socket_create, |
| 372 | KVER(4, 14, 0)) |
| 373 | (struct bpf_sock* sk) { |
| 374 | uint64_t gid_uid = bpf_get_current_uid_gid(); |
| 375 | /* |
| 376 | * A given app is guaranteed to have the same app ID in all the profiles in |
| 377 | * which it is installed, and install permission is granted to app for all |
| 378 | * user at install time so we only check the appId part of a request uid at |
| 379 | * run time. See UserHandle#isSameApp for detail. |
| 380 | */ |
| 381 | uint32_t appId = (gid_uid & 0xffffffff) % PER_USER_RANGE; |
| 382 | uint8_t* permissions = bpf_uid_permission_map_lookup_elem(&appId); |
| 383 | if (!permissions) { |
| 384 | // UID not in map. Default to just INTERNET permission. |
| 385 | return 1; |
| 386 | } |
| 387 | |
| 388 | // A return value of 1 means allow, everything else means deny. |
| 389 | return (*permissions & BPF_PERMISSION_INTERNET) == BPF_PERMISSION_INTERNET; |
| 390 | } |
| 391 | |
| 392 | LICENSE("Apache 2.0"); |
| 393 | CRITICAL("netd"); |