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/*
* Copyright 2015 The Android Open Source Project
*
* Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
* you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
* You may obtain a copy of the License at
*
* http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
*
* Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
* distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
* WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
* See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
* limitations under the License.
*/
#include <keymaster/contexts/soft_keymaster_context.h>
#include <memory>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <keymaster/android_keymaster_utils.h>
#include <keymaster/key_blob_utils/auth_encrypted_key_blob.h>
#include <keymaster/key_blob_utils/integrity_assured_key_blob.h>
#include <keymaster/key_blob_utils/ocb_utils.h>
#include <keymaster/key_blob_utils/software_keyblobs.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/aes_key.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/asymmetric_key.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/attestation_utils.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/certificate_utils.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/ec_key_factory.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/hmac_key.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/openssl_err.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/rsa_key_factory.h>
#include <keymaster/km_openssl/triple_des_key.h>
#include <keymaster/logger.h>
#include <keymaster/contexts/soft_attestation_cert.h>
using std::unique_ptr;
namespace keymaster {
namespace {
KeymasterBlob string2Blob(const std::string& str) {
return KeymasterBlob(reinterpret_cast<const uint8_t*>(str.data()), str.size());
}
} // anonymous namespace
SoftKeymasterContext::SoftKeymasterContext(KmVersion version, const std::string& root_of_trust)
: SoftAttestationContext(version), //
rsa_factory_(new RsaKeyFactory(*this /* blob_maker */, *this /* context */)),
ec_factory_(new EcKeyFactory(*this /* blob_maker */, *this /* context */)),
aes_factory_(new AesKeyFactory(*this /* blob_maker */, *this /* random_source */)),
tdes_factory_(new TripleDesKeyFactory(*this /* blob_maker */, *this /* random_source */)),
hmac_factory_(new HmacKeyFactory(*this /* blob_maker */, *this /* random_source */)),
root_of_trust_(string2Blob(root_of_trust)), os_version_(0), os_patchlevel_(0) {}
SoftKeymasterContext::~SoftKeymasterContext() {}
keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::SetSystemVersion(uint32_t os_version,
uint32_t os_patchlevel) {
os_version_ = os_version;
os_patchlevel_ = os_patchlevel;
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
void SoftKeymasterContext::GetSystemVersion(uint32_t* os_version, uint32_t* os_patchlevel) const {
*os_version = os_version_;
*os_patchlevel = os_patchlevel_;
}
KeyFactory* SoftKeymasterContext::GetKeyFactory(keymaster_algorithm_t algorithm) const {
switch (algorithm) {
case KM_ALGORITHM_RSA:
return rsa_factory_.get();
case KM_ALGORITHM_EC:
return ec_factory_.get();
case KM_ALGORITHM_AES:
return aes_factory_.get();
case KM_ALGORITHM_TRIPLE_DES:
return tdes_factory_.get();
case KM_ALGORITHM_HMAC:
return hmac_factory_.get();
default:
return nullptr;
}
}
OperationFactory* SoftKeymasterContext::GetOperationFactory(keymaster_algorithm_t algorithm,
keymaster_purpose_t purpose) const {
KeyFactory* key_factory = GetKeyFactory(algorithm);
if (!key_factory) return nullptr;
return key_factory->GetOperationFactory(purpose);
}
static keymaster_error_t TranslateAuthorizationSetError(AuthorizationSet::Error err) {
switch (err) {
case AuthorizationSet::OK:
return KM_ERROR_OK;
case AuthorizationSet::ALLOCATION_FAILURE:
return KM_ERROR_MEMORY_ALLOCATION_FAILED;
case AuthorizationSet::MALFORMED_DATA:
return KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
}
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
static keymaster_error_t SetAuthorizations(const AuthorizationSet& key_description,
keymaster_key_origin_t origin, uint32_t os_version,
uint32_t os_patchlevel, AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced,
AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) {
sw_enforced->Clear();
for (auto& entry : key_description) {
switch (entry.tag) {
// These cannot be specified by the client.
case KM_TAG_ROOT_OF_TRUST:
case KM_TAG_ORIGIN:
LOG_E("Root of trust and origin tags may not be specified", 0);
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_TAG;
// These don't work.
case KM_TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT:
LOG_E("KM_TAG_ROLLBACK_RESISTANT not supported", 0);
return KM_ERROR_UNSUPPORTED_TAG;
// These are hidden.
case KM_TAG_APPLICATION_ID:
case KM_TAG_APPLICATION_DATA:
break;
// Everything else we just copy into sw_enforced, unless the KeyFactory has placed it in
// hw_enforced, in which case we defer to its decision.
default:
if (hw_enforced->GetTagCount(entry.tag) == 0) sw_enforced->push_back(entry);
break;
}
}
sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_CREATION_DATETIME, java_time(time(nullptr)));
sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_ORIGIN, origin);
sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_OS_VERSION, os_version);
sw_enforced->push_back(TAG_OS_PATCHLEVEL, os_patchlevel);
return TranslateAuthorizationSetError(sw_enforced->is_valid());
}
keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::CreateKeyBlob(const AuthorizationSet& key_description,
const keymaster_key_origin_t origin,
const KeymasterKeyBlob& key_material,
KeymasterKeyBlob* blob,
AuthorizationSet* hw_enforced,
AuthorizationSet* sw_enforced) const {
keymaster_error_t error = SetAuthorizations(key_description, origin, os_version_,
os_patchlevel_, hw_enforced, sw_enforced);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
AuthorizationSet hidden;
error = BuildHiddenAuthorizations(key_description, &hidden, root_of_trust_);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
return SerializeIntegrityAssuredBlob(key_material, hidden, *hw_enforced, *sw_enforced, blob);
}
keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::UpgradeKeyBlob(const KeymasterKeyBlob& key_to_upgrade,
const AuthorizationSet& upgrade_params,
KeymasterKeyBlob* upgraded_key) const {
UniquePtr<Key> key;
keymaster_error_t error = ParseKeyBlob(key_to_upgrade, upgrade_params, &key);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
return UpgradeSoftKeyBlob(key, os_version_, os_patchlevel_, upgrade_params, upgraded_key);
}
keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::ParseKeyBlob(const KeymasterKeyBlob& blob,
const AuthorizationSet& additional_params,
UniquePtr<Key>* key) const {
// This is a little bit complicated.
//
// The SoftKeymasterContext has to handle a lot of different kinds of key blobs.
//
// 1. New keymaster1 software key blobs. These are integrity-assured but not encrypted. The
// raw key material and auth sets should be extracted and returned. This is the kind
// produced by this context when the KeyFactory doesn't use keymaster0 to back the keys.
//
// 2. Old keymaster1 software key blobs. These are OCB-encrypted with an all-zero master key.
// They should be decrypted and the key material and auth sets extracted and returned.
//
// 3. Old keymaster0 software key blobs. These are raw key material with a small header tacked
// on the front. They don't have auth sets, so reasonable defaults are generated and
// returned along with the raw key material.
//
// 4. New keymaster0 hardware key blobs. These are integrity-assured but not encrypted (though
// they're protected by the keymaster0 hardware implementation). The keymaster0 key blob
// and auth sets should be extracted and returned.
//
// 5. Keymaster1 hardware key blobs. These are raw hardware key blobs. They contain auth
// sets, which we retrieve from the hardware module.
//
// 6. Old keymaster0 hardware key blobs. These are raw hardware key blobs. They don't have
// auth sets so reasonable defaults are generated and returned along with the key blob.
//
// Determining what kind of blob has arrived is somewhat tricky. What helps is that
// integrity-assured and OCB-encrypted blobs are self-consistent and effectively impossible to
// parse as anything else. Old keymaster0 software key blobs have a header. It's reasonably
// unlikely that hardware keys would have the same header. So anything that is neither
// integrity-assured nor OCB-encrypted and lacks the old software key header is assumed to be
// keymaster0 hardware.
AuthorizationSet hw_enforced;
AuthorizationSet sw_enforced;
KeymasterKeyBlob key_material;
AuthorizationSet hidden;
keymaster_error_t error;
auto constructKey = [&, this]() mutable -> keymaster_error_t {
// GetKeyFactory
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
keymaster_algorithm_t algorithm;
if (!hw_enforced.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM, &algorithm) &&
!sw_enforced.GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM, &algorithm)) {
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_ARGUMENT;
}
auto factory = GetKeyFactory(algorithm);
return factory->LoadKey(move(key_material), additional_params, move(hw_enforced),
move(sw_enforced), key);
};
error = BuildHiddenAuthorizations(additional_params, &hidden, root_of_trust_);
if (error != KM_ERROR_OK) return error;
// Assume it's an integrity-assured blob (new software-only blob, or new keymaster0-backed
// blob).
error =
DeserializeIntegrityAssuredBlob(blob, hidden, &key_material, &hw_enforced, &sw_enforced);
if (error != KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB) return constructKey();
// Wasn't an integrity-assured blob. Maybe it's an Auth-encrypted blob.
error = ParseAuthEncryptedBlob(blob, hidden, &key_material, &hw_enforced, &sw_enforced);
if (error == KM_ERROR_OK) LOG_D("Parsed an old keymaster1 software key", 0);
if (error != KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB) return constructKey();
// Wasn't an OCB-encrypted blob. Maybe it's an old softkeymaster blob.
error = ParseOldSoftkeymasterBlob(blob, &key_material, &hw_enforced, &sw_enforced);
if (error == KM_ERROR_OK) LOG_D("Parsed an old sofkeymaster key", 0);
if (error != KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB) return constructKey();
return KM_ERROR_INVALID_KEY_BLOB;
}
keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::DeleteKey(const KeymasterKeyBlob& /* blob */) const {
// Nothing to do for software-only contexts.
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::DeleteAllKeys() const {
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::AddRngEntropy(const uint8_t* buf, size_t length) const {
RAND_add(buf, length, 0 /* Don't assume any entropy is added to the pool. */);
return KM_ERROR_OK;
}
CertificateChain
SoftKeymasterContext::GenerateAttestation(const Key& key, //
const AuthorizationSet& attest_params,
UniquePtr<Key> /* attest_key */,
const KeymasterBlob& /* issuer_subject */, //
keymaster_error_t* error) const {
keymaster_algorithm_t key_algorithm;
if (!key.authorizations().GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM, &key_algorithm)) {
*error = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
return {};
}
if ((key_algorithm != KM_ALGORITHM_RSA && key_algorithm != KM_ALGORITHM_EC)) {
*error = KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM;
return {};
}
// We have established that the given key has the correct algorithm, and because this is the
// SoftKeymasterContext we can assume that the Key is an AsymmetricKey. So we can downcast.
const AsymmetricKey& asymmetric_key = static_cast<const AsymmetricKey&>(key);
return generate_attestation(asymmetric_key, attest_params, {} /* attest_key */, *this, error);
}
CertificateChain SoftKeymasterContext::GenerateSelfSignedCertificate(
const Key& key, const AuthorizationSet& cert_params, bool fake_signature,
keymaster_error_t* error) const {
keymaster_algorithm_t key_algorithm;
if (!key.authorizations().GetTagValue(TAG_ALGORITHM, &key_algorithm)) {
*error = KM_ERROR_UNKNOWN_ERROR;
return {};
}
if ((key_algorithm != KM_ALGORITHM_RSA && key_algorithm != KM_ALGORITHM_EC)) {
*error = KM_ERROR_INCOMPATIBLE_ALGORITHM;
return {};
}
// We have established that the given key has the correct algorithm, and because this is the
// SoftKeymasterContext we can assume that the Key is an AsymmetricKey. So we can downcast.
const AsymmetricKey& asymmetric_key = static_cast<const AsymmetricKey&>(key);
return generate_self_signed_cert(asymmetric_key, cert_params, fake_signature, error);
}
keymaster_error_t SoftKeymasterContext::UnwrapKey(const KeymasterKeyBlob&, const KeymasterKeyBlob&,
const AuthorizationSet&, const KeymasterKeyBlob&,
AuthorizationSet*, keymaster_key_format_t*,
KeymasterKeyBlob*) const {
return KM_ERROR_UNIMPLEMENTED;
}
} // namespace keymaster